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This paper investigates the equity market reactions to the publication of the OECD BEPS Action Plan. 
We examine abnormal stock returns for firms incorporated and traded on the stock market in 36 OECD 
member states for various event dates during the developmental phase of the OECD BEPS Action Plan. 
Overall, we find a negative market reaction of multinational companies across the relevant events, which 
suggests that the additional tax costs from limiting tax avoiding behaviour outweigh the benefits such 
as more transparency, better international tax dispute resolution, etc related to the introduction of the 
OECD BEPS Action Plan. The conclusion of the Multilateral Instrument (MLI) results in the most 
negative cumulative reaction. US corporations show a significant negative mean return across all events, 
but we find less pronounced evidence for market reactions across the European Union (EU). We find 
that more tax avoiding firms have stronger negative reactions to the events than less tax avoiding firms. 
Additionally, we show that there are some spill over effects onto the equity markets for purely domestic 
firms. We provide first evidence as to how investors reacted to the introduction of the OECD BEPS 
Action Plan and contribute to the literature by further investigating the association between tax 
avoidance and stock return. 
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I.  Introduction  
Our study investigates the equity market reactions to the publication of the OECD BEPS Action Plan 
and several of the final and interim BEPS Action reports, thereby focusing on the key events of the 
introduction of the OECD BEPS Action Plan.  
Starting in 2010-2011, media reports have drawn attention to the fact that some highly profitable 
multinational companies seem to pay almost no corporate income tax in the source country, i.e. the 
country in which the income is (assumed to be) earned. Given that many countries face high levels of 
public debt and strong pressure to generate tax revenue, it is not surprising that this debate has brought 
the taxation of multinational firms to the top of the international policy agenda. 
The overarching aim of the OECD BEPS Action Plan is to reform the international tax regime as well 
as domestic tax laws to prevent or at least hamper tax-avoiding practices of internationally active 
companies and multinational enterprises in the future. Therefore, the OECD BEPS Action Plan, if 
properly designed and effectively implemented, would diminish international profit shifting and would 
align the location of economic activity with the location of taxation by requiring multinational 
companies to provide the necessary aggregate information. For “tax avoiding” companies this would 
result in an increase in tax payments while for less tax avoiding companies the tax burden should not 
increase.  
However, the increased tax burden of their more tax avoiding competitors might reduce their 
competitive advantage. For investors the prospective ramifications of the OECD BEPS Action Plan’s 
implementation on the tax burden of companies and their competitors might be an important element of 
forecasting the companies’ future after-tax profitability levels.  
The introduction of the OECD BEPS Action Plan provides a unique setting to gain insight in the 
expectations of investors and the association of stock return and tax avoidance as its implementation is 
highly probable/virtually certain. Additionally, the Action Plan affects multiple jurisdictions, which 
allows us to exploit a cross-country setting. This study investigates the perception of investors regarding 
the OECD activities to curb base erosion and profit shifting activities of multinational companies. To 
infer the investors’ perceptions to events regarding the OECD BEPS Action Plan the equity market 
reaction is examined. We perform an event study which has been used in a variety of research fields 
such as accounting, economic and finance (for an overview see eg Corrado, 2011; Kothari and Warner, 
2007).  
To gain insight in the perceptions of the investors towards the introduction of the OECD BEPS Action 
Plan, we investigate abnormal returns for firms incorporated and traded on the stock market in the OECD 
member states for four events during the development of the OECD BEPS Action Plan. Our main 
analysis focuses on the market reaction of multinational companies. However, we also examined the 
market reaction of domestic companies incorporated in the OECD member states as some measures of 
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the OECD BEPS Action Plan (i.e. interest barrier rule) may also address purely domestic companies. 
We identify the most significant event dates during the process of the introduction of the OECD BEPS 
Action Plan by using the OECD News page and Google Trend. In a next step we searched the DowJones 
Factiva database for confounding events in our chosen events window and did not find any major 
confounding events. We included all companies of the OECD member states with mostly daily share 
prices in the Thomson Reuters DataStream database and used a price-based event study methodology 
applying the market model approach to calculate the daily abnormal returns in the five-day event 
window of -2 to +2 days around the event date. To estimate the normal return we used the S&P Global 
1200 Index.  
Overall, we find a negative market reaction for multinational companies across the relevant events, 
which suggests that the investors perceive the additional tax costs from limiting the possibilities for 
aggressive tax planning practices outweigh the benefits (such as more transparency which reduces the 
hidden risks and costs associated with tax avoidance, better international tax dispute resolution, etc2) 
related to the introduction of the OECD BEPS Action Plan. Among the four events, the conclusion of 
the MLI shows the highest negative reaction. By splitting the sample into geographic subgroups, we 
examine the investor’s reaction in the European Union (EU) and USA. Whereas the US markets show 
a significant negative mean return across all events, we find inconclusive evidence for market reactions 
across the EU. Therefore, our results show that shareholders believe that the burden of less tax avoidance 
can be shifted to other stakeholder. 
In general, the results suggest that more tax avoiding multinational firms react more negatively to the 
events than less tax avoiding multinational firms. Additionally, we perform a cross-sectional analysis to 
examine the relationship between CAAR (Cumulative Average Abnormal Return) and firm 
characteristics. Overall, we find that tax avoiding firms (lower levels of Cash-ETR) react more 
negatively (lower levels of Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns – CAAR) to the publication events 
of the OECD BEPS Action Plan than less tax avoiding firms.  
Additionally, our findings suggest that domestic companies do not show a significant market reaction 
across all events. Overall, investors perceive domestic companies to not be affected by the OECD BEPS 
Action Plan. However, focusing on each event the results show that shareholders in purely domestic 
companies perceive some rules proposed in the OECD BEPS Action Plan may have consequences not 
only for multinational corporations. Although most of the Action points included in the OECD BEPS 
Action plan aim at tackling tax avoidance of multinational companies, some rules may also affect 
domestic companies which explains the negative reaction to publication of the final report (event (4)) 
and the adaption of the MLI (event (5)). 
                                                     




Our study contains several contributions to the economic, accounting and finance literature. First, we 
provide evidence as to how investors react to the introduction of the OECD BEPS Action Plan and thus 
information for future tax related regulatory changes and their consequences on the capital market. 
Second, we contribute to the literature by investigating the association between tax avoidance and stock 
return. Prior literature examines the stock price reaction to news about tax avoidance eg tax shelter 
involvement (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009) or disclosure of tax avoidance through whistleblowing 
activities for example LuxLeaks (Huesecken et al., 2018). However, our study investigates the market 
reaction to news about a restriction to tax avoiding practices by a wide-ranging prospective regulatory 
change and therefore extends existing literature. Our analysis covers 36 countries, which provides a 
fertile testing ground for our analysis concerning the perception of different investors. Third, we 
contribute to the stream of tax incidence literature by showing that shareholders believe the cost 
connected with less tax avoidance cannot be shifted to other stakeholders. 
Overall, it is essential for policymakers, governments and equity market participants to identify, 
understand and gain a better appreciation of the likely effects and the actual incidence of tax policies on 
tax avoiding behaviour. We show that the measures introduced to combat tax avoidance are perceived 
effective by shareholders who play a significant role in the tax strategy pursued by the company. 
Therefore, our study has policy implications for international organizations like the OECD or European 
Commission by providing them with an insight in the effectiveness for future similar measures.  In this 
respect, this study offers a unique new setting by analysing the introduction of the OECD BEPS Action 
Plan and providing more insight in the perceived allocation of increased tax costs. 
 
II. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
We build on three different bodies of existing literature: (1) the literature on tax incidence, (2) the 
literature on regulatory changes, especially tax law changes and their effects on the capital markets and 
(3) the literature on tax avoidance and profit shifting.  
In economic theory the corporate tax could be borne by shareholders, and other stakeholders like 
creditors, employees, suppliers or customers. Therefore, empirical studies play an important role in 
understanding the incidence of tax (Fuest, 2015). Based on several assumptions Harberger, 1962 shows 
that the burden of corporate income tax is fully borne by the shareholders. However, several subsequent 
studies suggest, that if changing the underlying assumptions (i.e. competitive labor markets), the burden 
can be shared with employees (e.g. Arulampalam et al., 2012; Suárez Serrato and Zidar, 2016; Desai et 
al., 2007; Hassett and Mathur, 2010; Felix, 2007; Fuest et al., 2013a; Liu and Altshuler, 2013) and other 




The question of who economically bears the tax burden is closely connected with the question of who 
actually bears the burden of less tax avoidance. In this context, the study of Dyreng et al., 2020 
investigates the relation between tax avoidance and tax incidence and shows in a model where 
shareholder do not entirely bear the burden of corporate tax, that firms whose shareholders bear less of 
the economic burden of corporate taxes engage in less avoidance. We contribute to this new stream of 
literature by investigating the perceived incidence of tax avoidance and therefore the question of who 
benefits from corporate tax avoidance (i.e. who suffers from less tax avoidance). 
Prior literature dealing with tax related effects on the stock market mainly focus on company-level 
information disclosure and changes to the disclosure policies, managerial decisions or specific results 
and events (e.g. stock splits: eg Fama et al., 1969; earnings announcements: e.g. Ball and Brown, 1968; 
Beaver, 1968; tax shelter involvement: Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009; Luxembourg Tax Leaks: eg Nesbitt 
et al., 2017). Considering event studies related to tax issues, a broad stream of literature investigates the 
market reaction to changes in specific tax categories or tax provisions. For example the increase in the 
individual (shareholder-level) income tax rate on share values (Ayers et al., 2002), capital gains tax 
changes (e.g. Lang and Shackelford, 2000) or the taxation of dividends (e.g. Auerbach and Hassett, 
2005; Amromin et al., 2008).  
Additionally, some event studies investigate the market reactions to corporate misdeeds (Ellert, 1975; 
Strachan et al., 1983; Garbade et al., 1982)  (Ellert 1975; Strachanet al, 1983; Garbade et al, 1982) and 
more specifically to tax avoidance or tax shelter involvement. Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009 find a negative 
market reaction for companies when there are news about the company’s involvement in tax shelters. 
The market reaction is more negative for companies in the retail industries than for non-retail companies 
and it is more negative for companies with effective tax rates below the median than for companies 
above the ETR-median. Gallemore et al., 2014 find that the stocks publicly revealed to have tax shelters 
exhibit significantly negative abnormal returns in a short (five days) window surrounding the revelation 
date. When expanding the event period to 30 days past the revelation date to test whether the short-
window effects on stock price are permanent or temporary, they find evidence that in the days that 
follow, the stock price systematically reverses back to its pre-event levels (although the immediate stock 
price response around the tax shelter is negative). Both studies thus find an immediate capital market 
reaction to news about a company’s individual tax behaviour. 
Our study, however, examines the overall market reaction to a wide-ranging prospective regulatory 
change that potentially affects individual companies. Studies that use similar investigation techniques 
are i.e. Armstrong et al., 2010 and Joos and Leung, 2012, which examine the market reaction to the 
adoption of IFRS in the European Union and the United States. Overall, they find a stronger market 
reaction for companies with lower information quality. They also find and a more positive reaction in 
cases where IFRS is expected to lead to higher information quality and to convergence benefits and less 
positive reactions for firms with higher litigation risk. Other studies examine the market reaction to the 
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act (eg Espahbodi et al., 2002; Li et al., 2008; Zhang, 2007; Jain and Rezaee, 2006) or 
the market reactions to the EU Audit Reform (Horton et al., 2018). 
Another stream of literature focuses on the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the United States. Cutler, 1988 
suggests that the differential taxation of new and old equity capital could have substantial effects on 
market values. However, the paper finds little evidence of a large market response to tax related 
information. Givoly and Hayn, 1991 investigate a specific change of the taxation of individual 
shareholders (the elimination of the preferential treatment of capital gains and the reduction in the 
individual tax rates) and its effect on share prices and find a strong negative reaction. The study of 
Voeller and Müller, 2011 investigates the reaction to the adoption of the German Tax Reform 2008, 
which included a decrease in the statutory corporate income tax rate and a considerable reduction of the 
individual income tax rate applicable to interest income at the shareholder level. This theoretically 
increased the tax benefit of debt financing over equity financing. However, Voeller and Müller, 2011 
do not find any significant overall market reactions but suggest positive price reactions of highly 
leveraged companies.  
The OECD BEPS Action Plan and its implementation process contains several differences compared to 
the research objects of previous event studies. The OECD is a consensus-based network and thus lacks 
the power to mandate domestic legal changes by its member states. The plan agreed on by the OECD 
and its member states is qualified as soft law. However, OECD member states and jurisdictions 
interested in joining the BEPS project are required to commit to the implementation of the BEPS 
package. Therefore, our study contributes to the above mentioned prior literature on the market reaction 
to wide-based regulatory changes.  
Basically there are two different possible reactions of the stock markets. Tax avoidance itself could have 
a positive effect on firm value (Frischmann et al., 2008; Wang, 2011; Robinson and Schmidt, 2013; 
Koester, 2011). Managers will use various techniques in trying to avoid taxes to meet the demand of a 
maximization of after tax cash-flows. As an example the study of Bryant-Kutcher et al., 2012 shows 
that the difference in tax costs is reflected in higher firm value for low tax rate firms. Another example 
for the positive relation between tax avoidance and firm value is the study of Chyz et al., 2013 which 
shows that returns decrease around labour unions elections, as they usually reduce the firm’s tax 
avoidance activities. Investors therefore may react negatively to the OCED BEPS Action Plan as tax 
avoiding activities are negatively affected by the measures introduced/proposed.  
On the other hand, tax avoidance may also lead to additional risk and therefore to additional costs for 
the company and thus to a lower firm value for the investors. These costs could include costs for tax 
litigation or for subsequent changes in tax planning strategies. The engagement in tax avoidance is also 
connected to a higher risk and uncertainty of penalties, back taxes and reputational losses. For example, 
Wilson, 2009 identifies 14 of 59 cases where the interest paid to tax authorities equalled on average 
40 % of the total tax savings produced through the involvement in tax shelter activities. In nine cases, 
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around 9 % of the total tax savings were spent on penalties. Another aspect is that shareholders expect 
the company to be “optimally aggressive” (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009). If aggressive tax avoidance 
becomes public, investors could interpret that not only as non-compliance towards tax authorities, but 
also aggressiveness towards the investors which could lead to higher scepticism about the accuracy of 
the financial statements (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009).  
Subsequently, the rising risk for increased attention by tax authorities in combination with penalties for 
illegal reduction of tax payments might lead to a decrease in cash flows (Crocker and Slemrod, 2005). 
If there is information symmetry and an equal belief of the extent and the payoff of tax avoidance, no 
relation between tax avoidance and firm value or shareholders reaction should be assumed (Hanlon and 
Heitzman, 2010). As stated above investors value consistent tax avoidance without an increase in risk 
or uncertainty. To the extent that the tax avoidance strategy of a firm exhausts non-risky opportunities, 
the positive valuation of investors towards tax avoidance practices is moderated by that risk (Drake et 
al., 2019). Therefore, managers have to weigh potential benefits (i.e. tax savings) against potential costs 
such as increased risk of challenges by tax authorities, penalties or reputational costs (Graham et al., 
2013).  
In order to evaluate the risk accompanying tax avoidance practices, investors demand appropriate 
disclosure. Additionally, Desai and Dharmapala, 2006 suggest a negative relation between tax avoidance 
and managerial rent extraction if tax avoidance reduces corporate transparency, and therefore increases 
the opportunity for managers to use tax avoiding practices for their personal benefit. Internal-control 
mechanisms are more likely in place at well-governed firms, whereas, poorly governed firms will not 
encourage tax avoidance (e.g. by equity incentives) because they lack the mechanisms to avoid 
managerial diversion (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). The study of Balakrishnan et al., 2011 shows that 
financial transparency increases the cost of aggressive tax planning. Although the transparency measures 
introduced by the OECD BEPS Action Plan mainly focus on the transparency towards the tax authority, 
this new financial transparency may curb risky or even illegal managerial actions and thus mitigates 
investors’ concerns about the hidden risks and costs associated with tax avoidance. Thus, the investors 
may also react positively to the OECD BEPS Action Plan, if the proposed measures support a higher 
information transparency and in consequence reduce the tax risk.  
Overall, it is difficult to ex ante predict investors’ perceptions towards the introduction of the OECD 
BEPS Action Plan. It depends on the investors’ expectations regarding the net benefits and costs of the 
implementation. Additionally, in the case of benefits outweighting the costs, the reaction depends on the 
investors believe of who bears the additional burden due to the new measures introduced by the OECD 
BEPS Action Plan, i.e. the costs of less tax avoidance. 
Under the assumption of efficient stock markets, the stock returns at the identified event dates will reflect 
the expectations of shareholders and (prospective) investors regarding the implementation process, its 
effect on the value of the firm and the allocation of the additional tax burden. As the introduction of the 
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OECD BEPS Action Plan is not concentrated on one specific date, we examine the market reaction of 
companies in in the OECD member states on different dates of interest (see below). The investors will 
react negatively if they expect an increase in (tax) costs. Yet, on the contrary the investors will react 
positively if they expect increasing disclosure requirements and thus a reduction of hidden risk 
(Armstrong et al., 2010; Frischmann et al., 2008) and an increase in information quality.  
The overarching objective of the Action Plan is to reduce profit shifting. Consequently, companies will 
face higher tax and tax-related costs, either because of reduced possibilities to shift profits or because 
of increased compliance costs e.g. for the fulfilment of newly introduced transparency standards. If 
shareholder believe that the higher tax burden has to be borne by the owners of the firm, these higher 
tax and tax-related costs will lead to lower after-tax profits and thus lower profit distributions to 
shareholders. Assuming a profit-maximising target function for investors, the relatively little increase 
in indirect control options due to transparency towards the tax authorities may be of secondary 
importance. Studies find that especially multinational companies are able to sustain more effective tax 
planning strategies (Rego, 2003; Mills et al., 1998; Fuest et al., 2013). Additional evidence for profit 
shifting is provided for the US (Clausing, 2003, 2016) and for European multinationals (Huizinga and 
Laeven, 2008; Weichenrieder, 2009; Loretz and Mokkas, 2015). The explicit aim of the OECD BEPS 
Action Plan is to combat this multinational tax avoidance, so we state the following hypothesis:  
H1: There will be a negative market reaction for multinational firms to the introduction of the OECD 
BEPS Plan. 
Taking into consideration all kind of transactions aimed at lowering the tax liability, different 
characteristics are attributed to tax avoiding firms. These characteristics are i.e. foreign activities (Rego, 
2003), R&D expenditures and a technology focus (Graham and Tucker, 2006), high leverage-ratios 
(Wilson, 2009; Lisowsky, 2010), or larger firm size (Shevlin and Porter, 1992; Rego, 2003). The 
literature shows a direct effect of tax avoiding behaviour for example the increase of cash flows i.e. after 
the deduction of a normally non-deductible expense, and an indirect effect by lowering the benefits of 
interest deduction due to a higher non-debt tax shield (e.g. Graham and Tucker, 2006). Overall, the goal 
of the OECD BEPS Action Plan is to complement existing standards to prevent double non-taxation or 
(too) low taxation associated with practices that artificially segregate taxable income from the real 
economic activities that generate the income. Firms, which conduct aggressive tax planning and thus try 
to reduce their tax liability, are potentially more affected by the measures introduced by the OECD 
BEPS Action Plan.  




III. Investigation Strategy 
A. Event Study Method 
According to the assumption of capital market efficiency, a stock price reflects all relevant information 
available. The share price movement is described as “random walk” and therefore the future share prices 
cannot be explained by past share prices (Fama, 1965). However, an adjustment to the price is not made 
until new information has been provided which the market considers relevant to the valuation. The 
adjustment then takes place without delay (Fama et al., 1969; Fama, 1965). Therefore, stock prices 
reflect all obtainable information and almost instantaneous adjustment (Brown and Warner, 1980, 1985; 
Schwert, 1981; Fama, 1991; Beaver, 1968). Additionally, the asset pricing model literature and the cash 
flow approach indicate that one-off adjustment in a corporate share price takes place if changes in after 
tax cash flows and disposable income occur (Cutler, 1988; Freebairn and Quiggin, 2010). 
Based on Ball and Brown, 1968 and Fama et al., 1969 we use financial market data, to measure the 
impact of a specific event on the value of a firm as reflected by the stock price. For our study, we choose 
a daily price-based event study model to draw inferences about the impact of the introduction of the 
OECD BEPS Action Plan on shareholders’ value. Through the application of the event study 
methodology abnormal price performance in financial assets is identified. By examining the abnormal 
price change it is possible to measure the effect of a specific event on the wealth of shareholders (Brown 
and Warner, 1980, 1985; Schwert, 1981; Fama, 1991; MacKinlay, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 2007; 
Kolari and Pynnönen, 2010; Beaver, 1968).  
In order to measure the equity market reaction to the OECD BEPS Action Plan we choose a short-term 
horizon to get a more precise and consistent measure. A short-horizon event study allows a more 
specified, reliable measure that is subject to less limitation and makes it possible to minimize the effect 
of possibly confounding events (Kothari and Warner, 2007; Corrado, 2011).  
To measure the investors’ perception, the price-based event study methodology uses daily abnormal 
returns. The abnormal return is defined as the difference between the actual ex post return of the security 
over the event window and the normal return of the firm over the estimation window (MacKinlay, 1997): 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡/𝑅𝑚𝑡]  (1) 
where ARit is the abnormal return of a firm at time t, Rit is the actual return and E[Rit/Rmt] is the normal 
(i.e., expected or predicted) return. For estimating the normal return, we apply the market model 
approach to control for market fluctuations and both risk and market-wide movements. The market 
model assumes that the normal or expected return on a security is linearly related to its covariance with 
the return on a so called market portfolio which is the return on some index including all marketable 
risky securities (Sharpe, 1963, 1964; Brown and Warner, 1980; Kothari and Warner, 2007). The 
abnormal return is then defined as follows:  
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𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑚𝑡) (2) 
where ?̂?𝑖 and ?̂?𝑖 are ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates from the estimation period 
following from the regression 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑚𝑡 and Rmt is the respective benchmark index. As our 
event study includes companies from diverse European, American, and Asian countries, we apply the 
S&P Global 1200 Index. Alternatively, if an event study is run for a certain country, the country’s 
broadest stock index can be used as the proxy for the market portfolio. By using the S&P Global 1200 
Index we control for global macroeconomic effects (see Schell et al., 2020), and hence increase the 
probability that the abnormal returns we detect are actually caused by the events of interest. For the 
estimation period to predict the normal return, we use an estimation window of 100 trading days 
beginning 102 days before the relevant event.  
After obtaining abnormal returns the cumulative reaction (CAR) of every firm over the specified event 
window is determined as the sum of abnormal returns over the event window.  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑖  (3) 
To make an overall inference about the average effect on the introduction of the OECD BEPS Action 
Plan on shareholders’ wealth, we calculate the Average Abnormal Return (AAR) and the Cumulative 
Average Abnormal Return across all firms (CAAR) over the event window. 







where ARit represents the AR estimated for stock i averaged across all firms.  





𝑖  (4) 
For the event window, we choose an interval of -2 to +2 days around the event date, which corresponds 
to a five-day event window. The days before the event are included to ensure that a possible leakage of 
information is observed. The return of the two days following the event date are included to add the 
effects after the stock market is closed and for allowing the market time to react to the event.  
 
B. Event dates 
Because the introduction of the OECD BEPS Action Plan was a process that evolved over time, we 
identify four relevant events between 2013 and 2016 that we determine as the events of most important 
announcements and publications. We identify these events by searching the OECD News page.3 We 
                                                     
3 See OECD newsroom, http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/publicationsdocuments/bydate/. 
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focus on the following events to gain an insight in the expectations of investors regarding the net benefits 
and costs of the OECD BEPS Action Plan. 
(1) The first event is 19th July 2013, when the Action Plan on BEPS was released.  
(2) On 16th September 2014, seven of the fifteen actions were addressed through recommendations and 
reports in the BEPS 2014 Deliverables and the next steps for BEPS work were outlined.  
(3) On 5th October 2015, the final report including all final measures was presented providing solutions 
to close gaps in rules that allow the shifting of corporate profits to low/no tax countries.  
(4) The next important step was the conclusion of negotiations between over 100 jurisdictions on the 
Multilateral Instrument (MLI) on 24th November 2016.4 The MLI facilitates the implementation of tax 
treaty related measures and implements the minimum standards to counter treaty abuse and to improve 
dispute resolution and entered into force on 1st July 2018 including 85 jurisdictions. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Additionally, we used Google Trends to identify most significant event dates. Google Trends analyses 
the popularity of search terms entered in Google Search. The Google Trends index for “BEPS” in the 
years 2013 to 2015 and for “Multilateral Instrument” in the year 2016 supports our previously used 
event dates and shows an increase in public interest in our identified event windows. Therefore, our 
event dates and windows correspond with the respective days with the highest relative search volumes 
in the relevant time period. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
C. Importance of correct dates and confounding events 
Identifying the correct events and making sure that no confounding news occur during the event window 
is a prerequisite for making the event study reliable (see Campbell et al., 1997). Confounding events 
could lead to a potential bias of our event study results, introduce noise or by excluding relevant events 
reduce explanatory power (Armstrong et al., 2010). Such events could therefore distort the empirical 
results of our event study.  
To minimize the probability of confounding news we search the DowJones Factiva database for other 
important events within our event windows. We search in the subject areas of Commodity/Financial 
Market News, Corporate/Industrial News, Economic News, Political/General News and Selection of 
Top Stories/Trends/Analysis without any limitations of region to ensure any confounding event is 
                                                     
4 In the United States the public holiday Thanksgiving was on 24th November 2016. We decided to change the event date for 
the USA for that specific event to the 25th November 2016 in order to keep the US firms in our sample and provide reliable 
results. Only 6 multinational and 15 domestic companies incorporated in the USA show a stock price on the 24th November 
2016. Excluding these 21 companies from our sample does not lead to different result. 
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identified. While we did not find any specific major news during our event windows we cannot 
completely exclude the possibility of confounding events influencing our results.  
Additionally, the event window should be short enough to exclude confounding events and long enough 
to include the effect of the relevant event (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). As the event dates concerning 
the introduction of the OECD BEPS Action Plan can be established with confidence, short event 
windows should capture all reactions relating to the events of interest.  
 
D. Data and Sample Selection 
We infer investors’ perceptions relating to the OECD BEPS Action Plan by examining all multinational 
companies of the OECD member states with daily share prices included in the Thomson Reuters 
DataStream database.  
Our sample includes those multinational companies for which mostly daily stock returns are available 
in the estimation window and the event window of each relevant event date. The company is qualified 
as multinational if foreign assets or foreign income is reported, and domestic otherwise. Already Ball, 
1978 showed that potentially severe biases could appear from infrequently traded securities. We thus 
exclude companies with more than 15 missing stock prices during the estimation window and require a 
minimum of 100 observations in the estimation window. Thereby, we avoid the issue of thin trading by 
including the requirement of availability of mostly daily stock price data.  
The calculation of abnormal returns therefore focuses on firms with informed investors, as changes in 
expectations are better reflected in frequently traded shares than in infrequently traded shares (Voeller 
and Müller, 2011). As stated above the S&P Global 1200 index data, also obtained from Thomson 
Reuters DataStream, is used to predict the normal return of our market portfolio. 
 
IV. Results 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
The sample yields the following number of firms for the geographic regions of European Union, USA 
and all other OECD member states5.  
For multinational companies the number of observations per event is relatively stable and ranges from 
5,811 (Event 1 – July 2013) to 6,088 (Event 2 – Sep 2014) with an average of 5,931 observations per 
event. In total, our sample consists of 23,719 observations. The geographic composition of our sample 
                                                     
5 In our geographical clustering the group called “Other” includes the countries: Australia, Canada, Chile, Iceland, Israel, 
Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, South Korea, Switzerland and Turkey. Columbia is not included as it joined the OECD in April 
2020, which was after the sample selection process. 
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is also stable across the events. On average 2,033 firms per event from the European Union (with a share 
between 33.8% and 35% - average: 34.73%) and 1,242 firms per event from the United States enter our 
investigation. The number of observations per event for domestic companies ranges from 8,200 (Event 
1 – July 2013) to 11,098 (Event 4 – November 2016). The full sample of domestic companies consists 
of 38,218 firms. The European Union shows on average 2,186 firms per event and the United Stated are 
present with 2,361 firms per event. The category “Other” includes all other OECD Member States. The 
most important countries with respect to number of observations in this group are Japan, South Korea 
and Canada. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
B. Empirical results  
Table 3 presents the results of the market reaction of MNEs in the OECD member states for four relevant 
event dates. The mean abnormal return across all four events and across all geographic regions shown 
in column 1 is negative and significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level. We thus find 
an overall negative reaction of the capital markets to the OECD BEPS Action Plan. Investors in general 
seem to assume an increase in tax payments and subsequently a decrease in after-tax profits caused by 
the measures proposed by the OECD BEPS Action Plan. The positive effects relating to the increase in 
financial transparency that may curb risky or even illegal managerial actions and thus mitigate investors’ 
concerns about the hidden risks and costs associated with tax avoidance seem to be of lower importance.  
While the overall abnormal return across all event dates is negative we find less conclusive results when 
focussing on the four event dates individually. Event date (1) that covers the first OECD publication of 
the project outline including the main pressure points and cursory descriptions of potential measures to 
address these pressure points, shows a non-significant slightly positive reaction of the capital markets. 
This early publication of the project outline thus had no effect on the capital markets. This can be 
explained by the rather cursory description of both the pressure points and the measures to address them 
as well as by the previous experience with similar OECD initiatives regarding direct taxation that in 
general did not lead to harmonized global tax reforms.  
The second event date (2), which covers the publication of the first set of more detailed reports for seven 
of the fifteen Actions shows the expected statistically significant negative abnormal return. The third 
event (3), which represents the publication of the final reports on the 15 Actions, shows a significant 
positive abnormal return. This seems surprising; however, this result can be attributed to the specific 
items that were published on that date. The second set of reports contained a number of actions such as 
dispute resolution and clarifications regarding transfer pricing, that can be regarded as more beneficial 
to the taxpayers than the first set of reports. Therefore, the positive cumulative abnormal return 
represents the positive surprise felt by the market after the publication of the second set of actions.  
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The conclusion of the MLI (event (4)) experienced the highest negative reaction of the investors. With 
the adoption of the MLI, the legal quality of the OECD BEPS Action Plan changed from a soft law 
measure with average chances of implementation given the recent history of similar OECD initiatives 
into a specific, legally binding act of implementation 
Focusing on the specific geographical regions namely the European Union and the United States, which 
form the largest share in our sample, the results for the various individual events are more multifaceted 
(see Table 3): For the USA the mean abnormal returns across all events is negative and significant. The 
EU however shows a non-significant cumulative abnormal return across all events. However, both 
geographic regions show at least for two event dates a significant negative abnormal return. The timing 
of the effect and the magnitude of the negative abnormal return is different across the geographical 
regions.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The USA show a negative significant cumulative abnormal return on three of the four event dates 
investigated in this study. The first two event dates (BEPS Action Plan; first set of reports) have negative 
cumulative abnormal returns, which can be interpreted as very timely reactions by the capital markets 
regarding US multinationals, which have been discussed by the media as being predominantly highly 
tax avoiding. Especially the USA recognized the event of the MLI adoption more negatively in 
comparison to Europe. Although the USA did not sign the MLI on 7th June 2017, it still will affect 
treaties with many jurisdictions and therefore will impact the tax planning process of the US 
multinationals (Bloomberg Tax, 2018). 
For European firms the market reactions on three of the four event dates is negative. These reactions 
support our hypotheses. On the first event date (publication of the OECD BEPS Action Plan), the market 
for European firms also shows a positive reaction. The European market thus at first seems to appreciate 
the initiative against aggressive tax planning structures as an initiative that potentially alleviates the 
competitive disadvantages of European firms which are traditionally seen as being less tax avoiding 
than US firms. Especially the German and the French stock markets (not tabulated) reacted positively 
since German and French firms have traditionally relatively high effective tax rates and are considered 
not overly tax avoiding (Thomsen and Watrin, 2018). The events (2) to (4) show a negative reaction, 
which indicate a subsequent change in the investors’ perceptions.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Since the OECD BEPS Action Plan aims at preventing aggressive tax planning by multinational 
enterprises, companies that employ more aggressive tax avoidance practices are potentially more 
affected by the proposed measures. We exclude loss firms because they may have different reasons or 
attenuated incentives for engaging in tax avoidance (e.g. Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). Therefore, the 
share prices of more tax avoiding firms might react stronger to the OECD BEPS Action Plan.  
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To measure the perception of investors towards tax avoidance we calculate the three year average cash 
effective tax rate for every MNE in our sample (Cash-ETR)6 (Dyreng et al., 2008; Hanlon and Slemrod, 
2009). We calculate the average cash effective tax rate to measure tax avoidance as perceived by 
investors (Dyreng et al., 2008; Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009). We use a period of three years including the 
event year and the two years before and deduct discontinued operations and extraordinary items for this 
period. By calculating the Cash-ETR over a longer period a better matching of taxes paid and the 
corresponding income is possible (Dyreng et al., 2008). Additionally, it is possible to identify firms that 
avoid taxes over a longer period of time (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Missing values of extraordinary 
items and discounted operations are set to zero. The total measure is replaced with zero if the company 
has a negative pre-tax income. If the Cash-ETR is not available, we replace the measure with the current 
tax expense. In order to limit the influence of outliers we only include values of Cash-ETR between zero 
and one. Because of the global sample that includes observations from countries with different corporate 
income tax regimes, we normalize the Cash-ETR with the local statutory corporate income tax rate of 
the MNE’s parent company (for a more detailed variable description of the variable Cash-ETR see 
Appendix A). 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 reports the results for the overall market reaction for the two groups of companies in the OECD 
member states. The more tax avoiding firms (Cash-ETR below the median) show a negative average 
abnormal return of 0.00343 on a significance level of 1% across all events. On the contrary, firms with 
a Cash-ETR above the median show no significant abnormal return across the events. This result 
supports our hypothesis 2, that more tax avoiding firms show on average a more negative reaction to the 
introduction of the OECD BEPS Action Plan. Overall, investors of more tax avoiding firms perceive the 
OECD BEPS Action Plan negatively. They seem to expect that the benefits introduced does not 
outweigh the higher tax costs from less tax avoidance.  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
The results for the events providing the Action Plan and the Interim Report to the public in the year 
2014, the Final Report in the year 2015 and the conclusion of the MLI support the previous described 
findings and show a more negative result for tax avoiding companies. Additionally, tax avoiding firms 
in the OECD react more negatively across all events.  
Focusing on the EU and USA and on each individual event separately, the results show again a very 
multifaceted picture. Table 4 shows that the capital market reaction at every event is more negative for 
more tax avoiding firms, but the difference is not always statistically significant.  
                                                     
6 To provide robustness we re-estimate our tax avoidance measure by using the measure introduced by Atwood et al (2012). 
Generally, we find that the market reaction at the individual events and the mean return across all events is more pronounced 
for tax avoiding firms. Therefore, the inference about the stronger reaction of tax avoiding firms in our second hypothesis holds.  
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Due to the inconsistent results for the EU and USA, we investigate the capital market reactions of the 
most tax avoiding firms (lowest quartile of the variable Cash-ETR) to the least tax avoiding firms 
(highest quartile of the variable Cash-ETR). Table 5 presents the results of the capital market reactions 
of the most and least tax avoiding firms. The market reactions of the whole sample of MNEs for the two 
groups of companies support our previous findings and the hypotheses that tax avoiding firms react 
more negatively to the introduction of the OECD BEPS Action Plan. Additionally, the reaction of the 
MNEs included in our sample across the event dates is stronger for the multinationals with the highest 
levels of tax avoiding activities in the USA. In addition, the results of the geographical subgroups 
support our hypotheses. In general, the results presented in Table 4 and Table 5 suggest that the capital 
market reactions are stronger for more tax avoiding companies. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
C. Cross-sectional analysis 
To provide robustness to the market reactions of tax avoiding companies in our findings and to explain 
cross-sectional variations in the investors’ perceptions of multinationals, we examine specific firm-level 
characteristics associated with tax avoidance. We examine the relationship between CAAR (Cumulative 
Average Abnormal Return) and firm characteristics by estimating the following regression model for 
each event t:  
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =∝0+ 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 (5) 
All firm characteristic variables are based on the year of the event t. To measure the investor’s perception 
of tax avoidance we use CashETR (for a detailed description see above and Appendix A). We include a 
series of control variables that have been shown by previous literature as being strongly related to tax 
avoidance (for references see e.g. Desai and Dharmapala, 2009). Our cross-sectional test requires 
additional data, which results in a smaller sample size of 23,566 firms. 
Table 6 reports the results of the estimated regression. The coefficient of Cash-ETR for the full sample 
over all events relevant for the introduction on the OECD BEPS Action Plan is positive and significant. 
The result suggests that a lower Cash-ETR is associated with a lower CAAR in the event windows. This 
represents a stronger and more negative market reaction the more tax avoiding a firm is. These results 
confirm our findings above (see Table 4 and 5) for the sample split at the median Cash-ETR. The 
indicator variable Loss shows a significant positive reaction. Thus, the share prices of loss making firms 
react stronger to the OECD BEPS Action Plan. Firm Size has a negative coefficient meaning that the 
reaction for larger firms is more negative. The negative coefficient for R&D expenditures can be 
interpreted as the markets’ perception that tax avoidance that is linked to R&D activity is more 
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sustainable than other forms of tax avoidance. By investigating the reaction for the EU and the USA, 
the same conclusions can be drawn.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
D. Domestic firms 
As the OECD BEPS Action Plan is primarily aimed at tackling tax avoiding practices of multinationals, 
domestic companies should show a weaker or even no significant reaction to the related events. The 
mean return of the full sample across all events for the introduction on the OECD BEPS Action Plan is 
not significant for domestic companies (see Table 7).  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
When splitting the sample into the geographical regions and focusing on the EU and USA we find again 
heterogeneous results. The results of domestic companies are rather similar as the results for MNEs. 
These results together with the results for event (2) and (4) suggest that there are some spill over effects 
onto the equity markets for purely domestic firms.  
This seems surprising, however, as stated above, the OECD BEPS Action Plan does not only contain 
rules proposed purely for multinationals. Rules such as the interest barrier rule (Action 4) or the 




In the light of the OECD BEPS Action Plan and its aim to prevent or at least hamper tax-avoiding 
practices of multinational enterprises by reforming the international tax regime as well as domestic tax 
laws we examine the overall equity market reactions to the stepwise publication of the OECD BEPS 
Action Plan. Our main analysis covers all multinational companies of the 36 OECD member states with 
daily share prices available.   
By using the event study methodology, investigating the market reaction to four key events of the 
introduction of the OECD BEPS Action Plan between 2013 and 2016, we find a negative market reaction 
of investors in multinational companies across all relevant events. This suggests that the additional tax 
costs from limiting aggressive tax planning practices outweigh the benefits (such as more transparency, 
better international tax dispute resolution, etc) related to the introduction of the OECD BEPS Action 
Plan. The conclusion of the MLI shows the highest negative reaction. By splitting the sample into 
geographic subgroups, we examine the investors’ reactions in different regions. While the USA show a 
significant negative mean return across all events, we find inconclusive evidence for market reactions 
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in the EU. However, all geographic regions show at least for two event dates a significant negative 
abnormal return. 
Further, we show that more tax avoiding firms have a stronger negative market reaction to the events 
than less tax avoiding firms. Additionally, we perform a cross-sectional analysis to examine the 
relationship between CAAR (Cumulative Average Abnormal Return) and firm characteristics. Overall, 
we find that tax avoiding firms (lower levels of Cash-ETR) react stronger (higher levels of Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns – CAR) to the publication of the various parts of the OECD BEPS Action Plan than 
less tax avoiding firms.  
The results of this paper provide evidence as to how investors reacted to the introduction of the OECD 
BEPS Action Plan. Overall, our study is essential for policymakers, like the OECD or European 
Commission to understand the economic consequences tax policies on tax avoiding behaviour and 
provides them with an insight in the effectiveness for future similar measures. The OECD BEPS Action 
plan introduction provides us with a unique setting as it is probable certain and by including 36 countries, 
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Appendix A  
 
Table 1: Variable Description 
This Table shows all variables, their definitions and data sources.  
 
 
Variables Description Details and Source 
AR 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑚𝑡) 
AR is the abnormal return of a firm at time t, Rit is 
the actual return and E[Rit/Rmt] is the normal (i.e., 
expected or predicted) return. For estimating the 
normal return, we apply the market model 
approach. For the estimation period to predict the 
normal return, we use an estimation window of 
100 trading days beginning 102 days before the 
relevant event. 








CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal return 
calculated over a 5-day event window centred on 
the date of the news and using the market model. 
Source: Datastream (DS) 
CashETR [TXPDt-2 / (PINC t-2  – DOPS t-2 
– SITEMS t-2)]/CITt 
Measure for tax avoidance: Cash ETR, calculated 
as taxes paid (WC04150) divided by pre-tax 
income (WC01401) less discontinued operations 
(WC04054) & extraordinary items (WC04225) for 
a period of three years. 
Set to missing if denominator <= 0. 
Replaced by current income taxes (WC01451 less 
WC04199) if variable taxes paid is not available.  
We normalize the Cash-ETR with the local 
mandatory corporate income tax rate of the 
MNE’s parent company in the year of the event. 
Source: Datastream (DS) / Worldscope (WC); 
OECD Tax Database (OECD) 
SIZE Natural log (MV) 
Firm size, calculated as the natural logarithm of 
Market value (MV). 
Source: Datastream (DS) / Worldscope (WC) 
ROA (PINC – SITEMS) / TAt-1 
Return on Assets, calculated as pre-tax income 
less extraordinary income divided by lagged assets 
(WC02999). 
Source: Datastream (DS) / Worldscope (WC) 
R&D RD / TAt-1 
Research & Development, Research and 
Development expenses (WC01201) divided by 
lagged assets 
Set to 0 if missing. 
Lev LTD / TAt-1 
Leverage, calculated as long-term debt 
(WC03251) divided by lagged assets. 
Source: Datastream (DS) / Worldscope (WC) 
Loss  
Indicator variable, equal to 1 if negative pre-tax 
income (WC01401), and zero otherwise. 





Table 1: Events of the OECD BEPS Action Plan development 
This Table presents the events between 2013 and 2016 that we determine as the events of important 
announcements and publications of the OECD BEPS Action Plan development process. The first column 
shows the event dates. The second and third column show a short description of the event and additional 
comments for more detailed information.  
 
Event Description Comments 
(1)   
07/19/2013 
OECD BEPS Action Plan 
Publication of BEPS Action Plan, 
including short description of 15 
Actions 
(2)   
09/16/2014 
Interim Report 
Publication of the detailed interim 
report including following: 
- Action 1: Digital Economy 
- Action 2: Hybrid Mismatches 
- Action 5: Harmful Tax Practices 
- Action 6: Treaty Abuse 
- Action 8: Transfer Pricing 
Intangibles 
- Action 13: Transfer Pricing 
documentation & CbCR 
- Action 15: MLI 
(3)   
10/05/2015 
Final Report 
Publication of the Final Report 
including detailed information on all 
Actions 
(4)   
11/24/2016 
Adoption of the Multilateral Instrument 
More than 100 jurisdictions concluded 
negotiations on the Multilateral 
Convention to Implement Tax Treaty 
Related Measures to Prevent Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting 







Figure 1: Google Trends index for term “BEPS” and “Multilateral Instrument” from 2013 to 2016 
This figure shows the Google Trends result for the term “BEPS” in the years 2013 to 2015 and for the term “Multilateral Instrument” in the year 
2016. The values on the y-axis (index) indicate the search interest relative to the highest point on the graph. The value 100 stands for the highest 






















Table 2: Sample Composition by geographic region and event 
This Table presents the number of multinational and domestic companies for which daily stock returns are 
available in the estimation window and the event window of each relevant event date. The sample is split into 
geographic regions including all OECD member states, which are a member of the European Union (EU), the United 
States (USA) and all the other OECD member states not included in the previous subgroups (Other). In our 
geographical clustering the group called “Other” includes the countries: Australia, Canada, Chile, Iceland, Israel, 


























MNE     
EU 2,039 – 35.0% 2,072 – 34.1% 2,014 – 34.2% 2,005 – 33.8% 
USA 1,183 – 20.5% 1,237 – 20.3% 1,254 – 21.2% 1,294 – 21.8% 
Other 2,589 – 44.5% 2,779 – 45.6% 2,631 – 44.6% 2,638 – 44.4% 
Total 5,811 6,088 5,889 5,937 
     
Domestic    
EU 1,753 – 21.4% 1,989 – 21.6% 2,303 – 23.7% 2,700 – 24.3% 
USA 2,061– 25.1% 2,444 – 26.6% 2,436 – 25.1% 2,502 – 22.6% 
Other 4,386 – 53.5% 4,772 – 51.8% 4,976 – 51.2% 5,896 – 53.1% 






Table 3: Market reaction of MNEs in the OECD member states to OECD BEPS Action Plan events  
This Table presents the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAAR) of the full sample for each event date. CAAR is calculated over a five-day 
window centred on the event date. Additionally, the results for the geographic subgroups, namely the European Union and the United States are reported. 
The S&P Global 1200 index is our benchmark index for calculating CAAR following the market model. Column (1) shows the mean return across all events. 
Column (2) is the market reaction for the release of the Action Plan in July 2013. Column (3) presents the CAAR at the release of the Interim Report and 
column (4) at the release of the Final Report. Column (5) presents the CAAR in the event window of the conclusion of the negotiation relating to the MLI. 
























OECD -0.00143*** 0.000814 -0.00568*** 0.00513*** -0.00573*** 
 (0.000419) (0.000773) (0.000642) (0.000909) (0.000976) 
Obs 23,725 5,811 6,088 5,889 5,937 
EU -0.000708 0.00569*** -0.00154 -0.00583*** -0.00119** 
 (0.000555) (-0.00124) (-0.000989) (-0.00146) (-0.00052) 
Obs 8,130 2,039 2,072 2,014 2,005 
USA -0.00391*** -0.00524** -0.0129*** 0.0167*** -0.0141*** 
 (0.00101) (0.00207) (0.00142) (0.00204) (0.00227) 









Figure 2: Market reaction of MNEs in the OECD member states to the OECD BEPS Action 
Plan events 
This figure shows the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAAR) of the full sample across 
all events during the five day event window centred on the event date (t=0). Additionally, the results 





































Table 4: Market reaction of MNEs in the OECD member states above and below the Cash-ETR median 
This Table presents the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAAR) for every MNE in our sample split of two groups at the median of the three year average cash 
effective tax rate (Cash-ETR) for the individual events. Loss firms are excluded. If the tax expense is not available, we replace the measure with the current tax expense. In order 
to limit the influence of outliers we only include values of Cash-ETR between zero and one. Because of the global sample that includes observations from countries with different 
corporate income tax regimes, we normalize the Cash-ETR with the local mandatory corporate income tax rate of the MNE’s parent company. The sample consists out of two 
groups: The first group with an average three-year Cash-ETR above the sample median (less tax avoiding companies) and the second group with an average three-year Cash-
ETR below the median (tax avoiding companies). The two geographic groups are the member states of the European Union (EU) and the United States (USA). Additionally, the 
mean return across all events again split at the median of the three year Cash-ETR is shown. To avoid heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are used. *, **, *** indicate 






Mean return  





























OECD -0.000477 -0.00343*** 0.000979 -0.00146* -0.00309*** -0.00476*** 0.00264** -0.00367*** -0.00215 -0.00396*** 
 (0.000602) (0.000532) (0.000894) (0.000884) (0.000820) (0.000840) (0.00120) (0.00113) (0.00170) (0.00132) 
Obs 9.250 9.250 2,273 2,274 2,350 2,351 2,294 2,295 2,331 2,332 
EU -0.00163** -0.002235*** 0.00490*** 0.00380*** -0.00268** 0.000717 -0.00772*** -0.0140*** -0.000676 -0.000290 
 (0.000699) (0.000704) (0.00151) (0.00146) (0.00121) (0.00132) (0.00193) (0.00179) (0.000555) (0.000823) 
Obs 3,116 3,116 770 771 790 791 772 772 783 783 
USA -0.00245** -0.00528*** -0.00314* -0.00663*** -0.00956*** -0.0114*** 0.0125*** 0.00450* -0.00997*** -0.00711* 
 (0.00112) (0.00122) (0.00169) (0.00153) (0.00145) (0.00156) (0.00273) (0.00236) (0.00260) (0.00366) 








Figure 3: Market reaction of MNEs in OECD member states above and below the Cash-ETR median 
This figure shows the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAAR) for all MNE in our sample split of two 
groups at the median of the three year average cash effective tax rate (Cash-ETR) during the five day event window 
centred on the event date (t=0). The sample consists out of two groups: The first group with an average three-year 
Cash-ETR above the sample median (less/non tax avoiding companies) and the second group with an average three-
year Cash-ETR below the median (tax avoiding companies). The two geographic groups are the member states of the 

































Table 5: Market reaction of MNEs in the OECD member states of the first and the fourth quartile of the Cash-ETR by geographic region 
This Table presents the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAAR) for every MNE divided in two groups within the highest and the lowest quartile of the three-year 
average cash effective tax rate (Cash-ETR) and split by geographic region for the individual events. Loss firms are excluded. For a detailed description of the measure see 
Appendix A. The sample consists out of two groups: The first group within the highest quartile of the three-year Cash-ETR (less tax avoiding companies) and the second group 
within the lowest quartile of the three-year Cash-ETR (tax avoiding companies). The two geographic groups are the member states of the European Union (EU) and the United 
States (USA). Additionally, the mean return across all events again split at the highest and lowest quartile of the three year Cash-ETR is shown. To avoid heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors are used. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
(1) 
Mean return  





























OECD 0.000100 -0.00457*** 0.00148 -0.00171 -0.00289** -0.00464*** 0.00479*** -0.00554*** -0.00236 -0.00577*** 
 (0.000960) (0.000777) (0.00125) (0.00131) (0.00127) (0.00129) (0.00184) (0.00161) (0.00285) (0.00197) 
Obs 4,625 4,625 1,136 1,137 1,175 1,176 1,147 1,148 1,165 1,166 
EU -0.000335 -0.00188* 0.00684*** 0.00430** -0.00272 0.00172 -0.00438 -0.0130*** -0.00127 -0.000849 
 (0.00104) (0.00101) (0.00207) (0.00199) (0.00176) (0.00205) (0.00292) (0.00248) (0.000816) (0.00131) 
Obs 1,558 1,558 385 386 395 396 386 386 391 392 
USA -0.000858 -0.00695*** -0.00365 -0.00772*** -0.00997*** -0.0124*** 0.0229*** 0.00607 -0.0139*** -0.0154*** 
 (0.00176) (0.00176) (0.00247) (0.00225) (0.00212) (0.00235) (0.00439) (0.00374) (0.00400) (0.00491) 








Figure 4: Market reaction of MNEs in the OECD member states of the first and the fourth quartile of 
the Cash-ETR 
This figure shows the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAAR) for all MNE divided in two groups within 
the highest (least tax avoiding firms) and the lowest quartile (most tax avoiding firms) of the three-year average cash 








































Table 6: Cross-sectional analysis 
 This Table presents results of estimating equation (5). The dependent variable is CAAR (Cumulative 
average abnormal return) over a five-day window centred on the event date. The S&P Global 1200 Index is our 
benchmark index for calculating CAAR following the market model. Cash-ETR is the measure for tax 
avoidance. SIZE represents the firm size, ROA the Return on Assets, R&D the Research & Development 
expenses and Lev the leverage and loss is an indicator variable set to one if negative pre-tax income is reported. 
Appendix A provides variable definitions. The number of firm-event observations depends on the available data 
for key variables used in the respective test.  To avoid heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are used. *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OECD EU USA 
    
Cash-ETR 0.00731*** 0.00695*** 0.0105** 
 (0.00216) (0.00244) (0.00511) 
SIZE -0.000350** -2.03e-05 -0.00137** 
 (0.000147) (0.000204) (0.000608) 
ROA -0.00295* -0.00491 0.00561 
 (0.00161) (0.00404) (0.00828) 
R&D -0.0396*** -0.0293*** -0.0399** 
 (0.00816) (0.0112) (0.0170) 
Lev 0.00219 0.00196 0.00108 
 (0.00200) (0.00321) (0.00456) 
Loss 0.00455*** 0.00707*** 0.00584 
 (0.00151) (0.00214) (0.00426) 
Constant -0.000257 -0.00316* 0.00441 
 (0.00151) (0.00181) (0.00566) 
    
Observations 23,566 8,063 4,958 





Table 7: Market reaction of domestic companies in the OECD member states to the OECD BEPS Action Plan events by geographic region 
 This Table presents the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAAR) of domestic companies for each event date. The sample is split in different 
geographic regions, namely the European Union (EU) and the United States (USA). CAAR is calculated over a five-day window centred on the event date. 
The S&P Global 1200 Index is our benchmark index for calculating CAAR following the market model. Column (1) shows the mean return across all events. 
Column (2) is the market reaction for MNEs in the OECD member states to the release of the Action Plan in July 2013. Column (3) presents the CAAR at 
the release of the Interim Report and column (4) at the release of the Final Report. Column (5) present the CAAR in the event window of the conclusion of 
the negotiation relating to the MLI. To avoid heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are used. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 















Mean return  
across all events 
(2) 
Action Plan  
(July 2013) 
(3) 








OECD -0.000206 0.00191 -0.00862*** 0.0107 -0.00430*** 
 (0.00270) (0.00117) (0.00122) (0.0104) (0.00113) 
Obs 38,218 8,200 9,205 9,715 11,098 
EU -0.00266** 0.00404* -0.00282 -0.00784*** -0.00243** 
 (0.00109) (0.00229) (0.00291) (0.00243) (0.00112) 
Obs 8,745 1,753 1,989 2,303 2,700 
USA 0.00836 -0.00439 -0.0127*** 0.0581 -0.00892** 
 (0.0108) (0.00334) (0.00352) (0.0415) (0.00356) 
Obs 9,443 2,061 2,444 2,436 2,502 
